

REPORT OF STEWARDS' INVESTIGATION IN RELATION TO THE 2008 SINGAPORE GRAND PRIX

A Background and allegations made to the FIA

Introduction

1. On 26 July 2009, the FIA was contacted by Nelson Piquet Snr and informed that Nelson Piquet Jnr ("NPJ") wanted to make a statement concerning an incident at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix.
2. It was arranged that NPJ would attend an interview at the FIA's offices in Paris on 30 July 2009. At that interview, NPJ provided a statement to the Chairman of the Stewards and an FIA external adviser from Quest, an investigations firm. A full copy of NPJ's signed statement dated 30 July 2009 appears at **Appendix 1** to this report.

Allegations made to the FIA

3. The key allegations made by NPJ are summarised below.
 - 3.1 Shortly before the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix on Sunday 28 September, ING Renault F1 ("Renault") Team Principal, Mr Briatore, summoned NPJ to his office where Mr Symonds, Renault's Executive Director of Engineering was also present. At that meeting, in the presence of Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds asked NPJ whether he would be willing to cause the safety car to be deployed in order to benefit his team-mate, Mr Alonso. Those present at the meeting understood that the request to cause the safety car to be deployed was, in effect, a request to crash deliberately. In part because of his fragile state of mind caused by the difficulties he had been experiencing in securing a contract to race for Renault in the 2009 season, NPJ agreed.
 - 3.2 Shortly after that meeting, Mr Symonds approached NPJ, showed him a map of the Singapore Grand Prix circuit and told him that he was to crash at Turn 17 on Lap 13/14. NPJ was informed by Mr Symonds that a crash at this point of the circuit would lead to the deployment of the safety car as the safety equipment and lifting cranes would not be able to access the scene of the accident quickly.
 - 3.3 NPJ was also told that Mr Alonso's car would be fuelled light and that his team-mate would pit shortly before the safety car, thus securing a significant advantage over the rest of the field.
 - 3.4 Prior to the crash, NPJ asked the team several times via the radio to confirm the lap he was on in order to ensure that he caused the incident during the correct lap. NPJ stated that it is unusual for a driver to enquire about the lap he was on, early in a race, when there was no prospect of him pitting in the near future.

- 3.5 At Turn 17 of Lap 14 of the Singapore Grand Prix, NPJ deliberately crashed his car, causing the deployment of the safety car. Mr Alonso benefited significantly from the timing of his pit stop and the deployment of the safety car following NPJ's accident and went on to record Renault's first victory of the year.
- 3.6 After the race, Mr Briatore discretely said "thank you" to NPJ. Thereafter, an engineer on NPJ's car questioned the nature of the incident as he found it unusual, but NPJ told him that he had simply lost control of the car.
- 3.7 NPJ believed that the telemetry data would confirm that the accident was caused on purpose because it would show that he continued accelerating into the accident whereas a "normal" reaction would be to lift off the throttle or brake as soon as possible.

FIA Response

4. At the time of NPJ's allegations, there were rumours suggesting that Renault had exercised an option to terminate NPJ's contract. It was also rumoured that there was, and had been for some time, considerable ill-feeling between the Piquet family and Mr Briatore. After the provision of NPJ's statement, the FIA was alerted to a number of press statements made by NPJ in which he expressed his anger at his treatment by Mr Briatore. As a result, the Stewards understand that the FIA President requested that, before the matter was taken any further, some independent support for NPJ's statement should be sought.
5. The Stewards were informed that members of the FIA's Technical Department were asked to review the telemetry data relating to the crash. The Technical Department's preliminary view was that the available data showed unusual features which appeared to lend support to NPJ's allegations.

Further statement

6. NPJ was interviewed again on 17 August 2009 and provided a signed Supplementary Statement to the FIA dated 25 August 2009. In that Supplementary Statement (which appears at **Appendix 2** to this report), NPJ provided additional information on the timing of the various race day meetings at the Singapore Grand Prix and reviewed the telemetry data made available by the FIA Technical Department. NPJ stated that the available telemetry data clearly supported his allegation that the crash was deliberate.

Reference to the FIA Stewards and Procedure

7. It being impractical to reconvene the Stewards of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, the FIA President requested, pursuant to Article 179(b) of the International Sporting Code ("ISC"), that a meeting of the Stewards of the 2009 Belgian Grand Prix (Lars Österlind, Vassilis Despotopoulos and Yves Bacquellaine) ("Stewards") and the FIA Observer (Herbie Blash) be convened in order to conduct further enquiries into the allegations ("Stewards' Investigation") with a view to the

preparation by the International Stewards of a report under Article 152 ISC.¹ In carrying out the Stewards' Investigation, and in gathering information in relation thereto, the Stewards have been assisted by the FIA Technical Department and the FIA's external advisors, Sidley Austin LLP and Quest.

8. Certain Renault employees whom it was considered might have information relevant to the Stewards' Investigation were summoned to come to the Stewards' room for interview. Before each interview, the Chairman of the Stewards handed the interviewee a notice setting out the nature of the allegations, the obligation to be full and frank in providing information and the need for confidentiality.
9. At the outset of the interview, the Stewards provided an additional oral explanation of the nature of the allegations. Questions were then put to the interviewees in relation to their roles and actions at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. Interviewees were also asked to consider whether they might have in their possession any documents of relevance to the Stewards' Investigation and, if so, to produce them to the Stewards. In the course of the afternoon of 27 August and the morning of 28 August, the Stewards met with all individuals identified at that stage as being relevant to the Stewards' Investigation. On 28 August, the Stewards were handed a hard disc containing what Renault stated to be its entire data file (except car data) from the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. Further information and documents were also provided to the Stewards by Mr Briatore on the morning of 29 August.

(B) The available technical and other information

10. The Stewards were reminded of the safety car rules as applicable in the 2007 and 2008 FIA Formula One World Championship. In short, once the safety car had been deployed, cars were prevented from pitting until all cars had lined up in formation behind the safety car.² The Stewards were also reminded of the fact that, at the 2008 German Grand Prix on 20 July 2008, Renault had benefited from the timing of the deployment of the safety car after an incident involving the Toyota driver, Glock. In that race, NPJ had finished second, having been in the pits at the time that the safety car was deployed.
11. The Stewards were reminded of the position in the 2008 FIA Formula One World Championship. Renault drivers, Fernando Alonso and NPJ had amassed 28 and 13 points respectively. Neither driver was in contention for the 2008 FIA Formula One Drivers' World Championship. Renault were in joint fourth place with Toyota in the 2008 FIA Formula One Constructors' World Championship with 41 points.

¹ The Stewards understand that, due to an unrelated decision of the Stewards of the Hungarian Grand Prix, it had not been clear whether Renault would participate at the European Grand Prix in Valencia in the week commencing 17 August 2009.

² This rule has since been changed.

12. Having shown good pace in the practice sessions for the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, Mr Alonso qualified in a disappointing 15th place on the grid after suffering a fuel pump problem at the start of the second qualifying session. NPJ qualified 16th on the grid.
13. The Stewards were assisted in their consideration of the incident by viewing video footage provided by the FIA Technical Department. A moving map was also made available, together with maps of the circuit, including a map showing the location of safety and lifting equipment (**Appendix 3**).
14. The FIA Technical Department had also produced print outs of telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash for the Stewards' review. In summary, the telemetry data appeared to the Stewards to indicate: (i) that NPJ had hit the throttle at Turn 17 on Lap 14 harder and earlier than in the preceding laps; (ii) that, as a result, NPJ's car had suffered significant wheel spin at Turn 17 on Lap 14; (iii) that, notwithstanding the significant wheel spin, after a very slight reduction in throttle pressure, NPJ had again increased the throttle pressure to 100%; and (iv) that NPJ had stayed hard on the throttle long after he had lost control of the car. Members of the FIA Technical Department indicated that this was unusual telemetry data and a highly unusual driver reaction for the particular situation.
15. The FIA Technical Department also provided a print out from Mr Alonso's telemetry data in which he had responded to wheel spin being generated at Turn 17 of the Singapore Grand Prix (although not on the same lap) by easing off the throttle. (A number of the telemetry data print outs produced by the FIA Technical Department appear at **Appendix 4** to this report.)
16. At the time of the interviews on 27 and 28 August, the Stewards had not heard the pit-to-car communications from the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, the FIA not having retained a copy. However, this information was provided by Renault in response to the Stewards' request to provide all relevant information and was reviewed after the interviews. It is summarised, insofar as the Stewards believe it to be relevant to their investigation, at section D, below.

(C) The evidence arising out of interviews on 27 and 28 August

17. The Stewards summoned Mr Alonso, Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and a number of Renault's other engineers to attend interviews in the Stewards' room. The interviews were attended by the Stewards of the meeting, the Chairman of the Stewards, the FIA Observer and the FIA's external advisers from Sidley Austin LLP and Quest. The following is a summary of the evidence provided in the course of the interviews insofar as it appears to the Stewards to be relevant to the allegations made by NPJ. It is worth noting at the outset that the following three points were generally accepted, including by the interviewees: (i) causing a deliberate crash would endanger safety;³ (ii) that a crash of the kind and at the

³ Mr Symonds disputed this point, claiming that, where the safety car is deployed, this removes the danger.

location of NPJ's at the Singapore Grand Prix would be likely to lead to the deployment of the safety car;⁴ and (iii) that the deployment of the safety car had benefited Mr Alonso significantly.

Mr Alonso:

18. Mr Alonso was interviewed first. He stated that he knew nothing of any meetings in the lead-up to the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix attended by Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and NPJ and knew nothing of the alleged plan to cause a deliberate crash. Mr Alonso also stated that Renault's strategy of fuelling him short represented an aggressive strategy but one that was reflective (to him at least) of the fact that he had qualified unexpectedly low on the grid and in these circumstances he would not have benefited from adopting a strategy similar to those ahead of him. He said the question of strategy was one which he largely left to his engineers.
19. Mr Alonso was shown telemetry data in relation to his own response to wheel spin at Turn 17 of the Singapore Grand Prix. He commented that his reaction as shown by that data – i.e. to lift his foot off the throttle and to reapply pressure on the throttle once the wheel spin had begun to subside – reflected a normal driver response to wheel spin while taking a corner.⁵ The Stewards did not consider it appropriate to ask Mr Alonso to analyse the telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash and compare the two.

Mr Symonds:

20. Mr Symonds was interviewed immediately after Mr Alonso. Mr Symonds' evidence appears to the Stewards to be central to the Stewards' Investigation. Accordingly, relevant extracts from Mr Symonds' interview are set out in this report. From these extracts, at least the following points emerge:
 - 20.1 Mr Symonds accepted that he attended a meeting in Mr Briatore's office with Mr Briatore and NPJ on the Sunday of the Singapore Grand Prix.
 - 20.2 Mr Symonds stated that Mr Briatore had arranged for NPJ to be called into the meeting in Mr Briatore's office.
 - 20.3 Mr Symonds accepted that he had discussed with NPJ the possibility of a deliberate crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, although he said the suggestion was raised by NPJ.

⁴ Mr Briatore disputed this point at interview, stating that Renault had no guarantee that the safety car would be deployed.

⁵ However, Mr Alonso made it clear that a driver's response to wheel spin would vary depending on factors such as the type of corner, the point of the corner at which the wheel spin occurred and the condition of the car's tyres.

20.4 Mr Symonds declined to answer questions in relation to a number of key allegations that were put to him on the basis of the evidence provided by NPJ.

20.5 Mr Symonds was warned that the Stewards may draw conclusions from his refusal to answer the specific allegations and Mr Symonds said he would expect that to be the case.

21. The following are extracts from a transcript of the interview with Mr Symonds:

FIA adviser: [In relation to the meeting among Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and NPJ on the day of the race.] *In your own words Mr. Symonds what do you recall being said to Nelson Piquet Jnr at that meeting? This is shortly before the race.*

Symonds: *I don't really remember it.*

FIA adviser: *You don't remember?*

Symonds: *No.*

FIA adviser: *Nelson Piquet Jnr says that he was asked by you to cause a deliberate crash. Is that true?*

Symonds: *Nelson had spoken to me the day before and suggested that. That's all I'd really like to say.*

[...]

FIA adviser: *Mr Symonds were you aware that there was going to be a crash at Lap 14?*

Symonds: *I don't want to answer that question.*

[...]

FIA adviser: *There is just one thing that I ought to ask you and put it to you so you can think about it at least. Mr. Piquet Jnr says that having had the initial meeting with you and Flavio Briatore you then met with him individually with the map of the circuit. Do you remember that?*

Symonds: *I won't answer, rather not answer that. I don't recall it but it sounds like Nelson's talked a lot more about it.*

FIA adviser: *Mr. Piquet Jnr also says that at that meeting you pointed out a specific place on the circuit where he was to have the accident and said it was because it was the furthest away from any of the safety or lifting equipment and gave the most likely chance of a safety car being deployed.*

Symonds: *I don't, I don't want to answer that question.*

[...]

FIA adviser: [Referring to the meeting in Mr Briatore's office among Mr Briatore, Mr Symonds and NPJ.] *Was it you that did the talking at that meeting Mr. Symonds?*

Symonds: *I'm sure it would have been both of us but I don't know for sure. Sorry that's a contradiction. I would imagine it would be both of us that would be normal. Actually probably more often it's Flavio that does the talking himself. I wouldn't necessarily always agree with what he's saying but the majority.*

FIA adviser: *Because just to be absolutely clear here what Nelson Piquet Jnr has said is that at that meeting it was you that asked him to have the crash deliberately?*

Symonds: *I can't answer you.*

FIA adviser: *Can I say that if Mr. Symonds you'd been put in the position where you were made to ask Mr. Piquet Jnr to crash it's much better, it would be much better for you in the long term to tell these stewards to hear that today?*

Symonds: *I fully understand that.*

FIA adviser: *Yes.*

Symonds: *I have no intention of lying to you. I have not lied to you but I have reserved my position just a little.*

FIA adviser: *And you're aware that the stewards may draw conclusions from your unwillingness to assist them in relation to what went on in that meeting?*

Symonds: *I would expect them to. I would absolutely expect that.*

FIA adviser: *I think I haven't got any further questions.*

22. On the basis of the interview with Mr Symonds, it appears to the Stewards that there was indeed a meeting on the Sunday of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix in Mr Briatore's office, which was attended by Mr Symonds and to which NPJ was summoned. It also appears reasonable in the circumstances to infer from Mr Symonds' failure to deny the specific allegations: (i) that there was discussion in or around that meeting of a deliberate crash; and (ii) that, at a short meeting thereafter, Mr Symonds had indeed indicated to NPJ on what lap – and where on the circuit – he ought to crash in order to ensure that the safety car was deployed to the benefit of Mr Alonso. In this regard, the Stewards note that, had there been no substance to the allegations made by NPJ and put to Mr Symonds, it would have been straightforward for Mr Symonds to deny them.
23. Mr Symonds was also shown telemetry data from Mr Alonso's wheel spin at Turn 17 (albeit not from Lap 14) of the Singapore Grand Prix and telemetry data from NPJ's crash. The following is taken from the section of the interview transcript where the relevant telemetry was discussed:

FIA adviser: [...] Mr. Alonso also told us that it would be [...] unusual if you feel that you've got wheel spin to apply the throttle still at full pressure. That that is likely to exacerbate the problems. Do you agree with that?

Symonds: Yes absolutely.

FIA adviser: Can we then look please at Mr. Piquet Jnr's telemetry [...] We've got two copies. Have you got the other one here Mr. Symonds?

Symonds: I have yes. Yeah.

FIA adviser: I think you'll anticipate what I'm going to ask you here.

Symonds: I think I will.

FIA adviser: There's quite, there's a more significant wheel spin recorded here. You'll see what has been marked by the technical department as a rapid increase in throttle pedal.

Symonds: Mm mm.

FIA adviser: There is on the throttle, there's a slight releasing of the throttle as the wheels start to spin but when the spin is at its greatest there appears to be a reapplication of the throttle at almost 100%.

Symonds: Yes.

[...]

FIA adviser: I put it to you Mr. Symonds that that's a very unusual piece of telemetry that would suggest that this may have been a deliberate crash?

Symonds: I would agree it's unusual [...]

FIA adviser: Would it suggest to you a deliberate crash?

Symonds: I'm not sure I've ever seen a deliberate crash so I, it's very unusual data.

FIA adviser: Counter-intuitive for a driver to put his foot full on the throttle when he's in a deep spin like that Mr. Symonds?

Symonds: It is. Yes when he has that much wheel spin it's counter-intuitive.

24. The Stewards note that Mr Symonds agreed with the FIA Technical Department's assessment that the telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash was unusual. It is also noteworthy that Mr Symonds accepted that NPJ's response to the wheel spin of putting his foot full on the throttle was "counter-intuitive". Mr Symonds made these observations in the context of knowing he had discussed a deliberate crash with NPJ before the race.
25. The Stewards also discussed Mr Alonso's strategy for the race with Mr Symonds to determine whether others in the Renault team might have been aware of the deliberate crash plan alleged to have been agreed among NPJ, Mr Symonds and

Mr Briatore. Although accepting that the decisions to fuel Mr Alonso light and to call him into the pits on Lap 12 were somewhat unusual, Mr Symonds stated that they were indicative of an aggressive approach and related to tyre choice and track position, rather than a result solely of discussions with NPJ regarding a possible deliberate crash on Lap 14. Mr Symonds's recollection of the genesis of Mr Alonso's strategy was not perfect at the time of interview but Mr Symonds did ensure the provision to the Stewards of information relating to Mr Alonso's strategy on 28 August 2009. This is examined in more detail at section (D), below.

26. Mr Symonds suggested at his interview on 27 August that he might wish to revert to the Stewards with further information, including information responsive to the various questions he had declined to answer. However, no such further information was provided on 27 August. On 28 August, Mr Symonds was summoned back before the Stewards to be asked if he wanted to give further information on the questions he had declined to answer. Mr Symonds again declined to answer the questions but did state that he had had an opportunity to review his files and listen to the pit-to-car communications relating to the race. As a result, he recalled that Renault had pulled Mr Alonso into the pits early as they did not want him to be held up by the Williams driver, Nakajima, and that Renault's computerised strategy system had not worked properly at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. He also advised the Stewards of a situation of which Mr Alonso had reminded him, when full throttle had been applied by Mr Alonso in circumstances where there had been wheel spin.

Other Engineers:

27. On 27 August, the Stewards also interviewed other largely more junior Renault engineers, who worked closely with Mr Alonso and NPJ, and the team strategist. These individuals had been identified either because the Stewards expected they would be involved in strategy decisions or because they were thought to have examined relevant telemetry either at, or after, the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. At the time of summoning the individuals, the Stewards had no reason to believe that they had been informed of the alleged plan to cause a deliberate crash on Lap 14. Rather, the Stewards wanted to ask the engineers about: (i) the genesis of the decisions to fuel Mr Alonso light and call him into the pits on Lap 12; and (ii) the telemetry relating to NPJ's crash.
28. A number of the other engineers commented that Renault had chosen a deliberately aggressive strategy for Mr Alonso, considering that to use the same strategy as those around Mr Alonso on the grid would have resulted in him finishing only a few places above his 15th place on the grid. Renault believed it had nothing to lose in taking an aggressive approach. The other engineers also commented that the softer, option tyres had been shown in practice to be good off the start but susceptible to rapid degradation and graining. This being the case, there had also been tyre-related reasons to fuel Alonso light and get the weaker option tyres out of the way on a comparatively short first stint.

29. A number of the other engineers commented that the telemetry data appeared to them to be inconclusive. It was possible, they felt, to interpret the data as indicative either of an accident or a deliberate crash.
30. Following the emergence of rumours in relation to NPJ's crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix (including in the press and in various internet fora), certain of the other engineers had reviewed elements of the available telemetry data. One engineer had put the evidence to NPJ shortly after the crash and asked whether the crash had been deliberate. NPJ had refuted that suggestion.
31. On balance, the Stewards have no reason to believe that the other engineers were aware in advance of the race of the alleged plan to cause a deliberate crash at Turn 17 on Lap 14.

Mr Briatore:

32. Mr Briatore did not arrive at the circuit until the morning of 28 August 2009. On arrival, he was summoned to appear before the Stewards. He acknowledged that, by then, he was aware of the Stewards' Investigation. In interview, Mr Briatore provided certain documentation relating to the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix and Renault's dealings with NPJ and his father, Mr Piquet Snr. Mr Briatore also provided a letter dated 28 July 2009, which he had written on Renault headed paper and in which he accused the Piquet family of, inter alia, extortion. (A copy of the letter dated 28 July 2009 is provided at **Appendix 5** to this report.) This letter was written after he had informed NPJ (on approximately 12 July 2009) that Renault would be exercising an option to terminate NPJ's contract. Mr Briatore's letter alleged that the Piquet family had been trying to extort money or services from him in exchange for not revealing information in relation to NPJ's crash at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix.
33. The Stewards understand from the interview that Mr Briatore had carried out no internal investigation before sending the letter, which included a denial of having knowledge of a deliberate crash. The Stewards also note that, notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations made against him and Renault by NPJ, Mr Briatore offered to avoid escalating the dispute between the two parties.
34. At interview, Mr Briatore also talked at length about the contractual situation between Renault and NPJ. Mr Briatore stated that at the time of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix, NPJ did not have a contract offer from Renault for the 2009 season. NPJ's contract for 2009 was concluded at the Brazilian Grand Prix, on 2 November 2008.
35. Mr Briatore pointed out repeatedly that NPJ's 2009 contract was on terms less advantageous to NPJ than his 2008 contract. Specifically, NPJ had taken a salary cut (from \$1.5 million to \$1 million) and Renault had included a performance clause in the contract providing that Renault would be able to terminate NPJ's contract in the event that he performed significantly worse than his team-mate Mr

Alonso. Mr Briatore considered this evidence to demonstrate that the allegations regarding a deliberate crash must be false. Mr Briatore said that, if NPJ had done Mr Briatore a favour by crashing deliberately in order to benefit the team, that "favour" would have been rewarded with a more, not less, advantageous contract.

36. As regards the specific questions that the Stewards were investigating, Mr Briatore responded as follows:
 - 36.1 he insisted that as far as he was aware, the crash had not been deliberate and had not been part of a plan;
 - 36.2 he accepted that a meeting took place on the Sunday of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix in his office between himself, Mr Symonds and NPJ;
 - 36.3 he denied that there had been any discussion at that meeting of a deliberate crash. Mr Briatore stated that the meeting had been called to encourage NPJ to focus on the race instead of his recent contract negotiations;
 - 36.4 he denied any knowledge of the short follow-up meeting at which Mr Symonds was said to have instructed NPJ to crash at Turn 17 on Lap 14;
 - 36.5 he initially denied having discretely said "thank you" to NPJ after the race, though then suggested that he might have said it "as a joke maybe".
 - 36.6 in relation to matters pertaining to race strategy, that he was not involved in deciding race strategy either in general or at the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix.
37. Mr Briatore's position is perhaps best summed up by the following excerpt from the transcript: *"I never talk with Nelsinho, I never talk about crashing the car, he's never coming to me tell me 'Flavio Jesus Christ I crash the car, you won the race, can you renew my contract?' You know if somebody do you a favour like that I just you renew the contract."*
38. In response to enquiries about the telemetry data, Mr Briatore said that there was little point in asking his opinion on the charts produced by the FIA Technical Department. He was content for those points to be addressed by Mr Alonso and by Renault's engineers.
39. Mr Briatore also suggested that the Stewards should meet with both NPJ's trainer and Matthieu Michel of Mr Briatore's management company. Mr Briatore was of the view that these individuals would provide evidence in relation to NPJ's fragile state of mind at the time of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix. However, as this point was made by NPJ himself in his statements to the FIA, this was not deemed necessary.

(D) The information contained in the data file provided by Renault

40. At the time of the interviews on 27 and 28 August, the Stewards did not have access either the pit-to-car communications or the information provided on hard disc by Renault. As a result, the review of the information provided has been focussed on the elements that the Stewards considered to be of most relevance to NPJ's allegations. Relevant sections of the pit-to-car communications have been transcribed by the FIA's external advisers and appear at **Appendix 6** to this report.
41. The information provided appears to be relevant to three key points: (i) the decision that Alonso would start on a light fuel load and would pit earlier than anticipated; (ii) whether NPJ asked what lap he was on before Lap 14; and (iii) what was said by the Renault team, particularly Mr Briatore and Mr Symonds, around the time of NPJ's crash at Turn 17 of Lap 14.

The decision to pit Alonso early

42. A document on the Renault hard disc entitled "*Singapore GP 2008 Pre race sheet*" appears to set out three potential strategies for both Fernando Alonso and NPJ (consisting of one-stop, two-stop and three-stop strategies for each driver). The document shows that a two-stop strategy for Alonso targets pitstops on Laps 14 and 46, while the same strategy for NPJ targets pitstops on Laps 28 and 44. A three-stop strategy for Alonso targets pitstops on Laps 14, 32 and 49. It appears from the documentation that the primary race strategy for Mr Alonso was a three-stop strategy.
43. An additional document on the Renault hard disc (entitled "*Fernando Alonso's race runsheet*") details Mr Alonso's lap times and the level of fuel in his car on each lap. The document demonstrates that Mr Alonso had 8.49kg of fuel when he came in for his first pitstop on Lap 12. As such, it appears that Mr Alonso had enough fuel at the start of the race to complete around 14 laps.
44. The pit-to-car communications support the documentary assertion that the primary race strategy for Alonso was a three-stop strategy and appear to indicate that the reason for switching from the primary three-stop strategy to a two-stop strategy was because Mr Alonso would otherwise be held up behind Mr Nakajima, the Williams driver. The pit-to-car communications demonstrate that Mr Symonds was the driving force behind the decision to switch to a two-stop strategy and that Mr Symonds was also behind the decision to pit Mr Alonso two laps earlier than had been envisaged. Relevant extracts are as follows.
45. Early in the race, Mr Symonds states "*while we're behind Nakajima we're f***ed, we're not going anywhere*". Approximately 30 seconds later, Mr Symonds says "*I can tell you now we're not three-stopping.*" Around one minute later, Mr Symonds states "*don't worry about fuel [running out] because I'm going to get him out of this traffic earlier than that.*"

46. Later in the race (but before Mr Alonso's first pitstop), Mr Symonds says "*we're gonna go [to] two [stops]*". Target laps are then discussed whereupon Mr Symonds is told that Mr Alonso is currently lapping 1.5 seconds quicker than Mr Nakajima. Mr Symonds responds "*one and a half...so we're going to catch him in about three laps...[...].right, I'm going to, I think we're going to stop him just before we catch him and get him out of it, the reason being we've still got this worry on the fuel pump, it's only a couple of laps short, we're going to be stopping him early and we're going to go to Lap 40*". In light of the Stewards' conclusions in relation to Mr Symonds' evidence at interview, this extract could be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to put on record reasons for calling in Mr Alonso on Lap 12 rather than on the anticipated Lap 14. However, the extract could also be indicative of genuine concerns regarding Mr Alonso's fuel pump and track position. The Stewards draw no conclusions in this regard.
47. Moments later, Mr Briatore interjects, saying "*'cause no way we're overtaking Nakajima with these tyre[s]*". Mr Symonds agrees, saying "*exactly and I don't want to waste one second behind him...[...].OK I think I'm going to stop him at the end of 12, that looks like it's all going to work out*".
48. Around one minute later, a race engineer says "*Pat, do you still not think that this is a bit early? We only did 6/10ths [quicker than Mr Nakajima] that lap.*" Mr Symonds replies "*no, no, it's going to be alright.*" The race engineer says "*OK, OK, understood...[...].just we were 3.1 [seconds behind Mr Nakajima] that last lap*". Mr Symonds responds "*yeah, I mean, we might get one more lap but I'm not gonna risk missing anything.*"
49. Mr Alonso comes in for his first pitstop at Lap 12, whereupon Mr Briatore says "*anyway, we had nothing to lose*". Mr Symonds agrees, replying "*exactly*".
50. The documentary evidence and communications data relating to Mr Alonso's strategy suggest to the Stewards that the race engineers were not aware of there being any plan to cause a deliberate crash on Lap 14. However, in light of the evidence provided in the course of Mr Symonds' interview, it appears to the Stewards that Mr Symonds' interventions could be interpreted as reflective of knowledge on his part that a safety car would be deployed on Lap 14.

NPJ's lap queries

51. In his statements to the FIA, NPJ indicated that he requested confirmation of his current lap on several occasions in order to ensure that he crashed on the correct lap. NPJ says this was unusual. The FIA Technical Department also advises that seeking lap confirmation early in a race, and a long way in advance of a scheduled pit stop, is unusual conduct for a driver. The contention that NPJ requested confirmation of his current lap is supported by the pit-to-car communications. Relevant extracts are as follows.

52. On Lap 8, NPJ asks "what lap are we in, what lap are we in?" A race engineer says: "he just asked what lap are we in." Mr Symonds responds "yeah, tell him that he's about to complete Lap 8. Is that correct?" The race engineer replies "that's correct yeah, but I think he was asking what lap are we in though but, which he already knows." Mr Symonds says "no just tell him, he is about, he's just completing, he is about to complete Lap 8".
53. A few moments later, the race engineer says to NPJ "you've just completed Lap 8, you've just completed Lap 8." NPJ replies "I can't see Gabria [NPJ's pit board holder], I can't see Gabria." Symonds says to the pit team "say understood, he can't see the pit board". A race engineer says to NPJ "understood". Approximately one minute later, NPJ says "it's better to count through the laps because I cannot see Gabria".
54. It is to be remembered that the race was the first night Grand Prix and NPJ says that the darkness was causing him difficulty in seeing the pit board. However, NPJ's comments in the radio communications are consistent with his statement and it is possible that the reason it was so important to NPJ to know what lap he was on so early in the race was to ensure that he carried out the alleged plan on the correct lap.

NPJ's crash

55. In the moments following Mr Alonso's first pitstop, Mr Symonds says "right, now let's concentrate on Nelson." A race engineer states that NPJ should be pushed to overtake Mr Barrichello, the Honda driver. Mr Symonds interjects "just hang on, let me just look at the end of this lap please...[...]...I just want to see where he is."
56. Around 30 seconds elapse. Then, as NPJ starts Lap 14, Symonds states: "OK right [race engineer], you gotta push him really bloody hard now, if he doesn't get past Barrichello he's a, he's going nowhere, he's got to get past Barrichello this lap." Mr Briatore adds: "tell him, push". The race engineer passes on the instructions to NPJ. Mr Symonds reiterates: "tell him to push really hard."
57. Approximately one minute later, while still on Lap 14, NPJ crashes.
58. When the safety car comes out, Mr Symonds is the first to identify that the crash has occurred at Turn 17. Mr Symonds instructs Mr Alonso's race engineer to: "tell him be careful, be careful, turn 17 I think it is."
59. On apparently seeing a re-run of footage of the crash, Mr Briatore states "f***ing disgrace, f***ing, he's not a driver."
60. In light of the evidence provided by in the course of Mr Symonds' interview, the Stewards find it noteworthy that Mr Symonds initiates the majority of material communications with NPJ in the period immediately prior to the crash on Lap 14.

(E) **The Stewards' preliminary conclusions regarding the incident**

61. It was accepted by Renault's Executive Director of Engineering, Pat Symonds, that there was a discussion regarding causing a deliberate crash between him and NPJ on Saturday 27 September 2008. This admission appears to give substantial support to NPJ's allegations that the crash was deliberate.
62. Mr Symonds said that it was NPJ who first suggested that a deliberate crash could be caused. The Stewards have not been able to put that allegation to NPJ prior to producing this report. Mr Symonds declined to give any more detail on this subject, either at interview on 27 or on 28 August.
63. Despite being very responsive throughout the rest of the interview, Mr Symonds declined to answer a number of key questions, for reasons he would not expand upon. The Stewards did not consider it appropriate to seek to compel Mr Symonds to answer these questions after he had declined to do so. However, Mr Symonds was warned that conclusions might be drawn from his refusal to answer the questions. He said that he "*would absolutely expect*" that conclusions would be drawn from his refusal to answer, but stated that he had not lied during his interview.
64. Taken together: (i) Mr Symonds' admission of the discussion of a deliberate crash prior to the race; (ii) Mr Symonds' refusal to answer questions in relation to the matters discussed at the meeting with Mr Briatore and NPJ; and (iii) Mr Symonds' refusal to deny that he indicated to NPJ where and on which lap he ought to crash, have led the Stewards to consider it reasonable, on balance, to conclude that the allegations made by NPJ are, in large part, true.
65. In addition, while the Stewards would not have found it to be conclusive if taken alone, the telemetry data relating to NPJ's crash appears to indicate a counter-intuitive response from NPJ as he begins to lose control of the car on Turn 17. Rather than lift off the throttle until the wheelspin is corrected, NPJ reapplies 100% throttle pressure and then keeps his foot down. Even when the level of wheel spin is increasing, NPJ continues to apply the throttle at 100%. The Stewards agree with the FIA Technical Department that this was a highly unusual approach for a driver on a tight street circuit with a concrete wall to the outside of the corner. On balance, when considered in light of the admission referenced at paragraph 61 above, the information appears to the Stewards to be suggestive of a deliberate crash and supportive of the allegations made by NPJ as to how he went about causing the crash.
66. As regards Mr Briatore, the allegations from NPJ and both the comments made and refusal to answer questions at interview by Mr Symonds appear to the Stewards to indicate that there may have been some discussion in Mr Briatore's presence of the possibility of causing a deliberate crash to benefit the team. However, in light of Mr Briatore's vehement denial of any knowledge of a plan to crash deliberately, the Stewards do not consider that they are in a position to draw


any definitive conclusion regarding Mr Briatore's knowledge or involvement. The Stewards would observe, however: (i) that Mr Briatore's reaction to being told by the Stewards in interview that his Executive Director of Engineering had admitted to discussing a deliberate crash with NPJ did not appear to be one of shock and/or anger; and (ii) that the letter Mr Briatore sent to the Piquets in relation to allegations of extortion was a strange reaction to such a serious allegation. The more logical response from a position of innocence might have been either to launch an internal investigation or to report the allegations to the FIA and take all necessary steps to confirm they were unfounded, thereby removing the alleged threat of extortion.

67. As regards Mr Alonso and the other engineers, the Stewards have found no evidence to suggest that they knew anything about any plan to cause a deliberate crash on Lap 14. Renault's strategy was aggressive and somewhat unusual but the Stewards do not conclude that individuals at Renault other than NPJ, Mr Symonds and possibly Mr Briatore were aware of any crash plan. This position appears to be supported by the documentary and radio communications evidence provided by Renault.
68. In his statements to the FIA, NPJ indicated that he requested confirmation of his current lap on several occasions in order to ensure that he crashed on the correct lap. The contention that NPJ requested confirmation of his current lap is supported by the pit-to-car communications.
69. The Stewards consider that there is evidence, which, on balance, suggests that NPJ's crash was deliberate and formed part of a plan aimed at securing a benefit for the team in which at least one senior Renault team member was complicit. Given the seriousness of the allegations and the supporting evidence, the Stewards are of the view that the matter should be referred to a meeting of the World Motor Sport Council for consideration.


4 September 2009

Lars Österlind

FIA International Steward

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized loop at the top, followed by a horizontal line, and then a vertical line that crosses the horizontal one.

Vassilis Despotopoulos
FIA International Steward



Lars Österlind

FIA International Steward

Vassilis Despotopoulos

FIA International Steward